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NOTES AND COMMENTS
as safe as circumstances, including the blackout, will permit."28 A
statute ought not to be interpreted as being in conflict with this
ordinary rule of law unless its words lead to no other possible con-
clusion.20
In marked contrast to the confusion found in the above cases, the
English courts have had little trouble in defining "reasonable care
under the circumstances." They have said that to drive any vehicle
during a blackout is an operation which must involvE a considerable
degree of danger to other road-users, but, since it is permitted by law,
it is not a tort in itself.30 However, the difficulty of sight is greatly
increased and so there is a duty on all road-users to minimize the
attendant danger.3' If, through the failure to take some such pre-
caution, the driver's difficulty is increased, that breach of duty is the
proximate cause of the injury.3 2 It is apparent, then, that as to this
particular problem, there is no change in the standard of care re-
quired; it is merely a question of emphasizing the word "reasonable"
as applied to a particular situation.33
Although no cases arising because of the blackout have been
found in the American reports, at least one state has already con-
sidered legislation which marks the beginning of the approach to this
problem.34 When such cases are brought before the courts in this
country, it is believed that the more desirable solution will be found
along the lines suggested above. The result reached by such reason-
ing will prevent an unwarranted extension of municipal liability and
will give nevertheless reasonable protection to the public.
28. See Note (1943) 59 L.Q. Rev. 13.
29. Id.
30. Franklin v. Bristol Tramways & Carriage, Ltd., [1941] 1 All
Eng. Rep. 188.
31. The duty is higher because it is almost impossible for a driver
to see a pedestrian whereas the use of dimmed lights makes the
presence of a vehicle ascertainable if the pedestrian keeps a sharp
lookout. Franklin v. Bristol Tramways and Carriage Co., Ltd.,
cited supra note 30; Miller v. Liverpool Cooperative Society, Ltd.,
[1940] 4 All Eng. Rep. 367, aff'd, [1941] 1 All Eng. Rep. 379;
accord, MacDonald v. Star Cabs, Ltd. et al., [1943] 1 Dom. L. Rep.
420 (Sup. Ct. Br. Col.). Similarly, vehicles must be driven
slower and greater care will be required on the part of drivers,
both as to other drivers, Miller v. Liverpool Cooperative, Ltd. et
al., supra, and as to pedestrians, MacDonald v. Star Cabs, Ltd., et
al., supra.
32. Franklin v. Bristol Tramways and Carriage Co., Ltd., supra,
note 30.
33. Notes (1941) 19 Can. B. L. 384, 15 Aust. L.J. 79.
34. Mass. Laws 1942, c. 13. See Cass, "The Blackout and Its Rela-
tion to Civil Liabilities" (1942) 22 B.U.L. Rev. 287, at 288, note 5.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT AS APPLIED TO
LABOR DISPUTES.
Members of the United Mine Workers of America were working
under a contract between the union and the Indiana Coal Operators
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Association which contract expired on March 31, 1941. Negotiations
for new working contracts were in progress, but, because labor and
management had been unable to agree on a temporary working con-
tract, the employees stopped work on March 31, 1941. For the period
of their unemployment, these workers claim benefits under the Un-
employment Compensation Act. The Review Board granted the claim
and the employer brought an action to question the decision. Held,
claim denied. Walter Bledsoe Coal Co. et al. v. Review Board of
Employment Security Division of Department of Treasury et al.,
Ind. -, 46 N.E. (2d) 477 (1943).
The instant case presented for the first time in Indiana the
question of whether employees engaged in a "labor dispute" can re-
cover benefit payments under the Unemployment Compensation Act.
In rejecting the argument that the unemployment was due solely
to the expiration of the labor contract and holding the facts of this
case to constitute a "labor dispute" within the disqualifying provision
of the statute, the Indiana court followed the clear weight of authority
among the states having substantially identical statutes. Most of the
cases on this point involve the same labor union and the expiration
of similar labor contracts. Ex parte Pesnell, 240 Ala. 457, 199 So. 726
(1940); Department of Industrial Relations v. Pesnell, 29 Ala. App.
528, 199 So. 720 (1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 590 (1941); Dallas
Fuel Co. v. Home et al., 230 Iowa 1148, 300 N.W. 303 (1941); Deshler
Broom Factory v. Kinney et al. v. - Neb. - , 2 N.W. (2d) 332
(1942); Miners in General Group et al. v. Hix et al., 123 W. Va.
637, 17 S.E. (2d) 810 (1941); Note (1941) 135 A.L.R. 920. Al-
though the court in the instant case found a strike existed, it is
suggested in Ex parte Pesnell, supra, that a strike or lockout need
not be involved to constitute a "labor dispute" as such is not required
by definition or by statute.
The Indiana Supreme Court ignored the question of whether
federal statutory definitions of "labor dispute" would be applicable.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §113 (c) (1940);
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §152
(9) (1940). The Appellate Court definitely rejected these definitions,
instant case, 43 N.E. (2d) at 1021 (Ind. App. 1942), but most of the
cases on this question utilize this source as illustrative, even if not
binding. Ex parts Pesnell, supra; Department of Industrial Rela-
tions v. Pesnell, supra; Dallas Fuel Co. v. Home, supra; Miners in
General Group et al. v. Hix et al., supra. Contra, Department of
Industrial Relations v. Drummond, - Ala. App. -, 1 So. (2d)
395 (1941).
The court fortified its decision by reference to the statutory
declaration of the purpose of this act which includes payment of
benefits "to persons unemployed through no fault of their own .... .
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §52-1501. The word "fault" was con-
strued to mean failure to work or volitional unemployment without
regard to the legality of such conduct. The court concluded that
the purpose of the act was "to provide benefits to those who were
involuntarily out of employment and not to finance those who were
willingly and deliberately refusing to work because of a failure of
their employer to accede to demands for higher wages."
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